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METAPHOR AND THE ‘EMERGENT PROPERTY’
PROBLEM : A RELEVANCE-T HEORETIC T REATMENT
ABSTRACT: The interpretation of metaphorical utterances often results in the attribution of emergent properties; these are
properties which are neither standardly associated with the individual constituents of the utterance in isolation nor derivable by
standard rules of semantic composition. For example, an utterance of ‘Robert is a bulldozer’ may be understood as attributing to
Robert such properties as single-mindedness, insistence on having
things done in his way, and insensitivity to the opinions/feelings
of others, although none of these is included in the encyclopaedic
information associated with bulldozers (earth-clearing machines).
An adequate pragmatic account of metaphor interpretation must
provide an explanation of the processes through which emergent
properties are derived. In this paper, we attempt to develop an explicit account of the derivation process couched within the framework of relevance theory. The key features of our account are:
(a) metaphorical language use is taken to lie on a continuum with
other cases of loose use, including hyperbole; (b) metaphor interpretation is a wholly inferential process, which does not require
associative mappings from one domain (e.g. machines) to another
(e.g. human beings); (c) the derivation of emergent properties
involves no special interpretive mechanisms not required for the
interpretation of ordinary, literal utterances.
1. INTRODUCTION: PRAGMATIC ACCOUNTS OF METAPHOR

The goal of a pragmatic account of metaphor is to explain how metaphor is understood, and in particular, how addressees construct an
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interpretation of the communicator’s meaning when a word or other
linguistic expression is used metaphorically. This is a special case of the
more general pragmatic goal of explaining how addressees bridge the
gap between the encoded linguistic meaning of an utterance and the
speaker’s meaning. Since sentence meaning is often fragmentary and
incomplete, and speaker’s meaning typically goes beyond it, this gap
is pervasive in verbal communication, but it is particularly obvious in
cases of metaphorical use. Thus, consider an utterance of (1):
(1)

Caroline is a princess.

The linguistically encoded meaning of the word ‘princess’ is (let’s say)
the concept PRINCESS, which denotes a subset of female royals. In appropriate circumstances, (1) might be metaphorically used to convey
that Caroline, who is not a female royal, is a spoiled, indulged girl,
used to special treatment, to having her wishes acted on, to being exempt from the daily chores that others have to perform, and so on. A
pragmatic account of metaphor is concerned with how the move from
encoded linguistic meaning to metaphorical interpretation is made.
Existing pragmatic accounts differ on several important points. One
is their view of how metaphorical use affects the truth-conditional content of utterances (in Grice’s terms, what is said; in relevance-theoretic
terms, what is explicated). On the standard Gricean account, the speaker
in metaphor does not ‘say’ anything, but merely ‘makes as if to say’
something that is not itself communicated, but is merely a vehicle for
conveying the speaker’s implicit meaning, or implicatures. In uttering
(1), for instance, the speaker might ‘make as if to say’ that Caroline
is a princess in order to implicate that she is a spoiled, indulged girl
(etc.).1 For a recent defence of this position, see Camp (2006). According to an alternative ‘semantic’, or ‘truth-conditional pragmatic’, view,
metaphor affects not only the implicatures of an utterance but also its
truth-conditional content, and more generally the content of any assertion or other direct speech act that it is used to perform. In (1),
for instance, the speaker might be seen as asserting that Caroline is a
PRINCESS *, where PRINCESS * is a modification of the encoded concept
PRINCESS , and the proposition that Caroline is a PRINCESS * is both a part
of what is explicitly communicated and a vehicle for implicatures. This
view is held in various guises by Black (1962), Recanati (1995, 2004),
Carston (1997, 2002a), Glucksberg, Manfredi, and McGlone (1997),
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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Sperber and Wilson (1998, 2008), Glucksberg (2001), Wilson and Sperber (2002, 2004), and Wilson and Carston (2007), and we will adopt it
here. However, since our main concern in this paper is with the ‘emergent property’ problem, which arises in all approaches, we will defend
the truth-conditional pragmatic approach only where it directly affects
the issue of how emergent properties are derived.
A second difference among existing pragmatic accounts is in how
closely they are intended to mesh with psycholinguistic investigations
of the online comprehension process designed to show, for instance,
whether a literal interpretation is always considered before a metaphorical one, or at what stage a particular feature associated with the encoded concept may be activated or suppressed. Let’s suppose that the
feature FEMALE ROYAL is closely associated with, hence activated by, the
encoded concept PRINCESS, and is suppressed or inhibited in the course
of constructing a metaphorical interpretation of (1). Cross-modal priming experiments might shed light on when (and to what extent) this
feature is activated, and when it is discarded or suppressed (see e.g.
Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson, and Werner 2001; Glucksberg, Newsome, and Goldvarg 2001; Noveck, Bianco, and Castry 2001; Rubio Fernandez 2005, 2007). Theoretical pragmatic accounts of metaphor differ
in how far they are intended to be responsive to such findings. Standard
Gricean accounts are usually seen as rational reconstructions with few
implications for online comprehension, while relevance theory, along
with other cognitively oriented approaches, aims to provide an account
of metaphor which is not only consistent with existing experimental
findings, but itself suggests further experimental tests (see e.g. van der
Henst and Sperber 2004).
Existing approaches also differ on whether they treat metaphor as
a distinct pragmatic category, or merely as part of a continuum that
includes hyperbole, approximation and other local pragmatic phenomena that arise at the level of the word or the phrase. Philosophers of
language such as Grice and Lewis seem to have envisaged distinct treatments for metaphor, hyperbole and approximation (e.g. Grice 1967/89:
34, 44-45; Lewis 1975, 1979). Relevance theorists, by contrast, have
consistently defended a continuity view, on which there is no clear cutoff point between ‘literal’ utterances, approximations, hyperboles and
metaphors, and they are all interpreted in the same way (for early work,
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see Sperber and Wilson 1985/6, 1986/95; for a detailed defence of the
continuity view, see Sperber and Wilson 2008). The ‘emergent property’
problem is sometimes raised as a challenge to the continuity view, since
metaphorical use is seen as creating emergent properties in a way that
non-metaphorical utterances do not (e.g. Romero and Soria 2007). We
will argue that the derivation of emergent properties requires no special
interpretive mechanisms, and is compatible with a continuity account
such as the one proposed in relevance theory.
Finally, existing accounts of metaphor differ in how far they treat
metaphor interpretation as properly inferential: that is, as taking a set
of premises as input and yielding as output a set of conclusions logically derivable from (or at least warranted by) the premises. At one
extreme are predominantly non-inferential, associative approaches, in
which PRINCESS in (1), for instance, would be seen as activating, but not
implying, associated features such as SPOILED, INDULGED, (etc.). Examples include the computational account proposed by Kintsch (2000) and
many treatments of metaphor within the cognitive linguistics framework (Lakoff 1987, 1994; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). At the other
extreme are fully inferential approaches such as the one proposed in
relevance theory, on which the interpretation of (1) would start from
the premise in (2a) and combine it with further contextual premises to
derive a conclusion such as (2b):
(2a)

Mary has said ‘Caroline is a princess’ (where ‘Caroline is a princess’ is a sentence with a certain—typically fragmentary—decoded meaning, or set of meanings).

(2b)

Mary meant that Caroline x is a
dulged girl (etc.).

PRINCESS *

and a spoiled, in-

An intermediate position is taken by Recanati (1995, 2004), who distinguishes ‘primary’, strictly associative, pragmatic processes from ‘secondary’, properly inferential, pragmatic processes, with the move from
decoded meaning to explicature (e.g. from PRINCESS to PRINCESS*) being treated as a primary, hence non-inferential, process and the move
from explicatures to implicatures (e.g. from the premise that Mary said
that Caroline x was a PRINCESS* to the conclusion that Mary meant that
Caroline x was a spoiled, indulged girl (etc.)) as secondary and properly inferential. (On inferential versus non-inferential approaches, see
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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Carston 2002b, 2007; Recanati 2002, 2004; Wilson and Carston 2007;
Sperber and Wilson 2008.)
Our main aim in this paper is to argue that the ‘emergent property’
problem does not present a serious challenge either to the continuity
view or to fully inferential accounts of metaphor interpretation. After
briefly outlining the relevance-theoretic approach to metaphor in section 2, we will introduce the ‘emergent property’ problem in section
3, and present our case for a fully inferential treatment of emergent
properties in section 4.
2. A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO METAPHOR
UNDERSTANDING

Relevance theory treats metaphor interpretation, like utterance interpretation in general, as guided by expectations of relevance. Relevance
is defined as a property of utterances and other inputs to cognitive processes (e.g. external stimuli such as sights and sounds, and internal
representations such as thoughts, memories or conclusions of inferences). An input is relevant to an individual when it connects with
available contextual assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects (e.g.
true contextual implications, warranted strengthenings or revisions of
existing assumptions). For present purposes, the most important type
of cognitive effect is a contextual implication, which is deducible from
input and context together, but from neither input nor context alone.
For instance, (3a) might contextually imply (3c) when processed in the
context of mentally represented information such as (3b):
(3a)

John lives in London.

(3b)

London is expensive to live in, culturally exciting, with a crumbling infra-structure . . .

(3c)

John has high living expenses, easy access to theatres and cinemas, problems with transport, health care, etc . . .

Other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects, and the
smaller the mental effort required to derive them (by representing the
input, accessing a context and deriving any contextual implications),
the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Relevance theory makes two general claims about the role of relevance in cognition and communication. According to the Cognitive
Principle of Relevance, human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance, so that perceptual, memory retrieval and inferential processes are likely to include automatic heuristics for selecting
potentially relevant inputs and processing them in the most relevanceenhancing way. According to the Communicative Principle of Relevance, every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its
own optimal relevance. To be optimally relevant, an utterance (or other
act of overt communication) must be at least relevant enough to be
worth processing, and moreover the most relevant one compatible with
the communicator’s abilities and preferences. Together, the Communicative Principle of Relevance and the presumption of optimal relevance ground an inferential comprehension heuristic that provides the
basis for deriving a warranted conclusion about the speaker’s meaning:
RELEVANCE-THEORETIC

COMPREHENSION HEURISTIC

(a)

Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation
of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and
referential indeterminacies, enriching or adjusting the encoded
meaning, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implicatures, etc.).

(b)

Stop when your expectation of relevance is satisfied (or abandoned).

A hearer using this heuristic during online comprehension would proceed in the following way. The goal is to find an overall interpretation that satisfies the presumption of optimal relevance. To achieve
this goal, he must enrich the decoded sentence meaning at the explicit
level (by disambiguating, assigning reference, and adjusting it in other
ways to be discussed below), and complement it at the implicit level
(by supplying contextual assumptions which combine with the adjusted
explicit meaning to yield enough contextual implications or other cognitive effects to make the utterance relevant in the expected way). What
route will he follow in disambiguating, assigning reference, enriching or
adjusting the linguistic meaning, constructing a context, deriving contextual implications, and so on? According to the relevance-theoretic
comprehension heuristic, he should follow a path of least effort, testing
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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the most accessible referents, disambiguations, contextual assumptions
and implications, etc., and stop at the first overall interpretation that
yields enough implications (or other cognitive effects) to satisfy his expectations of relevance (see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986/95; Carston
2002a; Wilson and Sperber 2004). This is his best hypothesis about the
speaker’s meaning.
On this approach, any utterance addressed to someone automatically creates a presumption of relevance, which will be satisfied by deriving enough true contextual implications (or other positive cognitive
effects), at a low enough processing cost, to make it relevant in the expected way. Given the commitment of relevance theory to a continuity
view on which there is no clear cut-off point between metaphorical and
non-metaphorical uses, what is true of utterance interpretation in general should also be true of metaphor. And indeed, a metaphorical use of
(1) (‘Caroline is a princess’) might in appropriate circumstances satisfy
the hearer’s expectations of relevance by contextually implying that Caroline (who is not necessarily a princess) is a spoiled, indulged girl, who
expects special treatment, is used to having her wishes granted (etc.).
For these implications to be properly warranted, the hearer would have,
on the one hand, to construct an appropriate context, and, on the other,
to develop the encoded sentence meaning into an appropriate explicit
content by disambiguating, assigning reference and enriching or adjusting the linguistic meaning in an appropriate way. These pragmatic
processes are seen as taking place not in sequence but in parallel, with
tentative hypotheses about context, explicit content and cognitive effects being mutually adjusted or elaborated as online comprehension
proceeds. A successful overall interpretation is one that yields enough
implications, at a low enough cost, to satisfy the hearer’s expectations
of relevance, and is internally consistent in the sense that these implications are properly warranted by the context, the presumption of
relevance and the enriched explicit content (explicature). (For discussion of this mutual adjustment process, see Sperber and Wilson 1998;
Carston 2002a; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Wilson and Carston 2007;
Sperber and Wilson 2008.)
According to relevance theory, the explicit content which results
from mutual adjustment with context and cognitive effects has typically
undergone not only disambiguation and reference assignment, but also

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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modification (or ‘modulation’) of one or more of the encoded concepts.
In (1) (‘Caroline is a princess’), for instance, the explicit content might
contain not the encoded concept PRINCESS but a related concept PRINCESS *, which is more specific than the encoded concept in some respects
and more general in others. The modified concept which is the output of the mutual adjustment process is sometimes called an ‘ad hoc’
concept, because it is fine-tuned to satisfy the particular expectations
of relevance raised by the utterance. (On ad hoc concepts and their
contribution to explicitly communicated truth-conditional content, see
e.g. Carston 1997, 2002a; Sperber and Wilson 1998, 2008; Wilson and
Sperber 2002; Wilson and Carston 2007).
One way of arguing for a continuity view of metaphor is to show
that ad hoc concept construction is not specific to metaphor interpretation, but also arises in hyperbole, approximation and even in literal
utterances, as a by-product of the same relevance-guided mutual adjustment process. In (4a-c) below, for instance, the ad hoc concept
expressed by use of the italicised expression is more specific than the
encoded one, and therefore has a narrower denotation:
(4a)

All politicians drink.

(4b)

Buying a house is easy if you’ve got money.

(4c)

No more wine, thanks. I have to get up tomorrow.

Thus, the speaker of (4a) might be understood as asserting not that
all politicians drink liquid (an obvious truth), but that they drink alcohol, or, more specifically, that they drink significant amounts of alcohol.
Similarly, the speaker of (4b) might be understood as asserting not that
buying a house is easy if you have any money at all (an obvious falsehood), but that buying a house is easy if you are suitably rich. Finally,
the speaker of (4c) might be understood as asserting not merely that
she has to get up at some point or other the next day (which is unlikely
to be relevant enough in the circumstances), but that she has to get
up early enough for an extra glass of wine to be inadvisable. In each
case, the concept the speaker is understood as expressing (i.e. DRINK*,
MONEY *, GET UP *) is narrower than the encoded one, applying only to
a subset of the items covered by the encoded concepts (DRINK, MONEY,
GET UP ). In each case, the outcome of the ad hoc concept construction
process is an interpretation that would intuitively be classified as literal
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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(see Wilson and Sperber 2002).
While lexical narrowing happens even in literal utterances, lexical
broadening is generally seen as involving some departure from literalness. In (5a-c), for instance, the concepts expressed by use of the
italicised expressions might be more general than the encoded ones,
with (marginally or substantially) broader denotations:
(5a)

You should take your empty bottles for recycling.

(5b)

This policy will bankrupt the farmers.

(5c)

The reservoirs are dry.

(5d)

The Red Sea is boiling.

In (5a), the word ‘empty’, which has a relatively strict sense, might be
intended and understood as an approximation (involving a relatively
marginal broadening of the encoded concept to cover a ‘penumbra’
of cases which strictly speaking fall outside the linguistically-specified
denotation). On this approximate interpretation, the hearer is being
urged to recycle not only strictly EMPTY bottles but also bottles which
are EMPTY * (i.e. close enough to being EMPTY for the differences to be
inconsequential). In (5b), ‘bankrupt’ may be understood either literally,
or as an approximation (BANKRUPT*); it may also be understood as a
hyperbole (BANKRUPT**), where hyperbole involves a more substantial
broadening of the encoded concept, and hence a greater departure from
the encoded meaning. On this interpretation, the speaker of (5b) would
be understood as asserting merely that as a result of the policy, the
farmers will be substantially poorer than might have been expected or
desired. Similarly, in (5c), ‘dry’ may be used literally, approximately (‘almost DRY ’) or as a hyperbole (‘substantially closer to DRY than expected
or desired’). Example (5d) illustrates all these possibilities, and one
more. As in previous cases, ‘boiling’ may be understood literally (‘at or
above boiling point’), as an approximation (‘close enough to BOILING for
the differences to be inconsequential’) or a hyperbole (‘closer to BOILING
than expected or desired’); it may also be understood metaphorically,
as suggesting, for instance, that the water (although not necessarily hot
enough to be BOILING, BOILING* or even BOILING**) is bubbling, seething,
emitting vapour (etc.).2 From this perspective, metaphor interpretation
involves a more radical type of broadening than approximation and hyperbole, but, in accordance with the continuity view adopted in relewww.thebalticyearbook.org
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vance theory, arises in essentially the same way. (On the varieties of
broadening, see Glucksberg 2001; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Carston
2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008.)
As Carston (1997, 2002a) has shown, narrowing and broadening often combine to yield an adjusted concept that is narrower than the encoded concept in some respects, and broader in others. In (4b) above,
for instance (‘Buying a house is easy if you’ve got money’), ‘money’
might be narrowed, on the one hand, to exclude amounts of money that
would be manifestly inadequate in the circumstances, but also broadened to cover not only actual money holdings, but also possessions such
as land and art works with a suitable money value. Similarly, in (5a)
above (‘You should take your empty bottles for recycling’) ‘empty’ might
not only be broadened to cover cases where a small amount of liquid
is left in the bottle, but also narrowed to cover only a designated type
of liquid (e.g. the liquid that the bottle was designed to hold). On
this interpretation, the hearer of (5a) is being urged to recycle not only
bottles that are strictly or approximately empty, but also, for instance,
‘empty’ wine or olive oil bottles that have been rinsed and left full of
soapy water.3 Metaphor interpretation typically involves a combination
of broadening and narrowing. Thus, (1) (‘Caroline is a princess’), said
of the speaker’s younger sister, might be metaphorically understood as
expressing a concept PRINCESS* which is broader than the encoded concept in some respects (since it applies to some people who are not actual
princesses), and narrower in others (since it applies only to people—
including princesses—who are spoiled, indulged (etc.)).
To put a little more flesh on this account, let’s assume that the encoded concept PRINCESS is an address or node in memory with three
main functions:
(a) it provides access to mentally represented information about princesses (e.g. the logical information that a princess is necessarily
a female royal of a certain type, and a reservoir of more or less
strongly evidenced encyclopaedic assumptions about princesses,
or particular sub-groups of princesses—that they have public duties to perform, may be spoiled, indulged, etc., and so on)
(b) it is a constituent of thoughts about princesses, and is therefore
activated when thinking about princesses, processing utterances
about princesses, etc.
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech

11

Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston

(c) it expresses a property whose extension is the set of (actual or
possible) princesses.
When (1) (‘Caroline is a princess’) is literally understood, it logically
implies that Caroline is a female royal, and this affects the truth conditions of the utterance. It does not logically imply that Caroline has
public duties to perform, is spoiled, indulged (etc.), since not all princesses have these properties. However, by adding to the context the
encyclopaedic information that princesses of a certain type are spoiled,
indulged (etc.), and assuming that Caroline is the type of princess of
whom these assumptions hold, the hearer may derive the contextual
implications that Caroline is spoiled, indulged, (etc.), which may make
the utterance relevant in the expected way. The effect of this interpretation would be a narrowing of the encoded meaning PRINCESS to an ad
hoc concept PRINCESS*, which denotes only the subset of actual princesses of whom it is true that they are spoiled, indulged (etc.), and a
consequent restriction in the content of any assertion the speaker was
taken to make. Similar accounts would apply to (4a-c) above.
On this approach, what triggers the narrowing process is the search
for relevance (i.e. for enough implications, at a low enough processing
cost, to make the utterance relevant as expected). How are these implications derived? By adding to the context encyclopaedic assumptions
made accessible by the encoded concept PRINCESS (or by other concepts
activated by the utterance or the discourse) and enriching the encoded
meaning into an explicit content that combines with these assumptions
to yield the expected implications. What direction does the narrowing process take? It follows a path of least effort, considering first the
most highly activated contextual assumptions and implications (including those made salient by particular expectations of relevance). When
does the narrowing process stop? When enough implications have been
derived to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. (For further discussion, see Sperber and Wilson 1998; Carston 2002a; Wilson
2003.)
As expected on the continuity view adopted in relevance theory, a
metaphorical interpretation of (1) may be constructed along similar
lines, by mutually adjusting context, explicit content and contextual
implications so as to satisfy expectations of relevance. Suppose, for instance, that the most obvious referent for ‘Caroline’ (i.e. the one found
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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by following a path of least effort in looking for implications) is the
speaker’s younger sister, who is manifestly not royal. Then the logical information that a princess is a certain type of royal could make
no contribution to relevance: its deployment would be a waste of effort, and even if it happened to be automatically activated, it should
play no role in interpreting what the speaker meant by uttering (1).
The result of dropping this feature would be a concept whose denotation would include all females, and would therefore be considerably
broader than the denotation of PRINCESS. At the same time, by adding to
the context encyclopaedic assumptions made accessible by the encoded
concept PRINCESS, and assuming that Caroline belongs to the subset of
females of whom these assumptions hold, it may be possible to derive
enough contextual implications to make the utterance relevant in the
expected way. The effect of adopting these assumptions would be a narrowing of the encoded concept. In these circumstances, the outcome of
the adjustment process for ‘princess’ would be an ad hoc concept PRINCESS ** which is narrower than the encoded concept in some respects
(since it applies only to a subset of actual princesses), but broader in
others (since it applies to some people who are not princesses). The resulting overall interpretation might be presented as in (6a-c) (with no
constraints on the order in which the premises and conclusions are constructed, and tentative hypotheses about each being mutually adjusted
in the course of online comprehension):
(6a)

Explicit content:CAROLINE x

IS A PRINCESS **

(6b)

Contextual assumptions:
(etc.)

A PRINCESS ** IS SPOILED , INDULGED

(6c)

Contextual implications:

CAROLINE x IS SPOILED , INDULGED

(etc.)

On this account, both narrowing and broadening are by-products
of the search for relevance. What makes (1) intuitively classifiable as
‘literal’ is the fact that the implications on which the relevance of the
utterance depends hold only of actual princesses. What makes (1) intuitively classifiable as an ‘approximation’, ‘hyperbole’ or ‘metaphor’ is
the fact that the implications on which the relevance of the utterance
depends hold of some things that are not actual princesses (with the difference between ‘approximation’, ‘hyperbole’ and ‘metaphor’ depending
on the degree and direction of broadening). In each case, the search for
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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relevance proceeds in the same way, and categories such as ‘approximation’, ‘hyperbole’, ‘narrowing’ or ‘broadening’ play no role in the
interpretation process at all.
To illustrate this point in more detail, consider (7) (a variant of
example (5d) above (‘The Red Sea is boiling’)):
(7)

The water is boiling.

As noted above, this utterance might be intended and understood literally, as an approximation, as a hyperbole or as a metaphor, with no clear
cut-off point between these possibilities. On the relevance-theoretic account outlined above, all these interpretations are arrived at in the same
way: by adding to the context encyclopaedic information made accessible by the encoded concept BOILING (and by other concepts activated
by the utterance or the discourse) and deriving enough implications
to satisfy the hearer’s expectations of relevance. What makes the resulting interpretation intuitively ‘literal’, ‘approximate’, ‘hyperbolic’ or
‘metaphorical’ is simply the particular set of encyclopaedic assumptions
actually deployed in making the utterance relevant in the expected way.
Let’s suppose that the encyclopaedic assumptions simultaneously activated by both ‘water’ and ‘boiling’ (and therefore potentially highly
accessible for the interpretation of (7)) include those in (8a-d):
BOILING WATER :

(8a)

Encyclopaedic assumptions4

SEETHES AND BUBBLES , HIDDEN UNDERCURRENTS , EMITS VAPOUR ,

etc.
(8b)

TOO HOT TO WASH ONE ’ S HANDS IN , TOO HOT TO BATHE IN ,

(8c)

SUITABLE FOR MAKING TEA , DANGEROUS TO TOUCH ,

(8d)

SAFE TO USE IN STERILISING INSTRUMENTS ,

etc.

etc.

5

etc.

Then (7) would be intuitively ‘metaphorical’ if the implications that
make the utterance relevant in the expected way depend on (8a), but
not on (8b-d) (so that the speaker is not understood as committed to
the claim that the water is hot)6 ; it would be intuitively a ‘hyperbole’
if these implications depend on (8b), but not on (8c-d); it would be an
‘approximation’ if these implications depend on (8c), but not on (8d),
and it would be ‘literal’ if the deployment of (8d) is crucial to making
the utterance relevant in the expected way (so that the denotation of
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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the concept the speaker is taken to have expressed includes only items
that are actually BOILING). In each case, the comprehension process
works in the same way, by selection of an appropriate set of contextual assumptions to act as premises for the derivation of the expected
contextual implications.
The relevance-theoretic account of metaphor comprehension has
some similarities to the ‘class-inclusion’ (or dual reference) account developed by Sam Glucksberg and colleagues (e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar
1990; Glucksberg, Manfredi, and McGlone 1997; Glucksberg 2001). In
their view, the word ‘jail’ in ‘My job is a jail’ is understood as naming
a superordinate category of confining, punishing, inescapable things,
which includes actual jails AND the speaker’s job. There are several
differences of detail between the two approaches, and two more important differences.7 First, as already indicated, we locate the account
of metaphor within a general account of lexical pragmatic processes of
concept modulation or adjustment, which includes both narrowing and
several varieties of broadening that would not standardly be treated as
metaphorical: that is, we are arguing for a continuity view of metaphor.
Second, our aim is to develop a relevance-based account of the cognitive processes that mediate the move from encoded concept to ad hoc
concept via mutual adjustment of explicit content, context and contextual implications: that is, we are arguing for a fully inferential account
of metaphor. Recently, there has been some evidence of convergence
between the two approaches: Glucksberg and colleagues have been exploring the effects of discourse context and considerations of relevance
on online metaphor comprehension (Glucksberg 2004), and relevance
theorists have been exploring the implications of Glucksberg’s work for
theoretical pragmatic accounts of metaphor (Rubio Fernandez 2005,
2007; Vega Moreno 2007). Such convergences are likely to benefit research in both psycholinguistics and pragmatics.

3. THE ‘EMERGENT PROPERTY’ PROBLEM

A certain range of examples has been seen by philosophers, psychologists and pragmatists as presenting a challenge to both continuity and
inferential accounts of metaphor. Cases that have been widely discussed
include those in (9):
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(9a)

Robert is a bulldozer.

(9b)

Sally is a block of ice.

(9c)

That surgeon is a butcher.

In (9a), the speaker might be understood as implicating that Robert is
forceful, stubborn, persistent, insensitive to other people’s feelings and
points of view, and so on; in (9b) she might be understood as implicating that Sally is reserved, unable to express her own feelings, ungenerous or unresponsive to the feelings and overtures of others, and so
on; and in (9c), she might be understood as implicating that the surgeon in question is extremely incompetent, dangerous, not to be trusted
with the lives of patients, and so on. The question is, where do these
implicatures come from? How are they derived?
According to the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor interpretation outlined in section 2, (9a-c) should be interpreted, along similar
lines to (6) above, by adding to the context encyclopaedic information
made accessible by the encoded concepts BULLDOZER, BLOCK OF ICE or
BUTCHER (or by other concepts activated by the utterance or the discourse) and deriving the contextual implications that Robert is forceful,
stubborn (etc.), that Sally is reserved, inexpressive (etc.), or that the
surgeon is incompetent, dangerous (etc.); if selected by the comprehension heuristic for incorporation into a conclusion about the speaker’s
meaning these would be accepted not only as implications but as implicatures. But, at the very least, the derivation process cannot be as
direct as the one shown in (6) above. In the case of (9a) and (9b), the
reason is obvious: our encyclopaedic knowledge of bulldozers, those
large machines used for clearing earth, rocks, rubble, etc., is unlikely
to include the information that they may be stubborn, persistent, insensitive to the feelings and viewpoints of others (etc.). Similarly, our
encyclopaedic knowledge of blocks of ice (solidified H2 O) is unlikely to
include the information that they may be reserved, unable to express
their own feelings, unresponsive and ungenerous to others (etc.). Only
human beings can have psychological properties such as these (taking
them literally, as we must, if we care about explanation). (9a) and (9b)
are cases of what is often called ‘category’ crossing: necessary falsehoods, where a literal interpretation of the predicate is incompatible
with a literal interpretation of the subject. While (9c) is not a neceswww.thebalticyearbook.org
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sary falsehood (although it is factually implausible that the same person would be both a surgeon and a butcher), a similar problem arises,
because our encyclopaedic knowledge of butchers is unlikely to include
the information that they are incompetent, dangerous, not to be trusted
with the lives of patients, and so on.
The question for an inferential account of metaphor is: how can
there be a genuinely inferential transition from the premise that the
speaker uttered the sentence ‘Robert is a bulldozer’ to the conclusion
that the speaker asserted that Robert x is a BULLDOZER* and implicated
that he is forceful, stubborn, persistent, insensitive to the feelings of
others (etc.); and so on for the other examples?8 More generally, whatever the proposed account of metaphor, whether it is inferential or not,
the question is, how do the properties of forcefulness, stubbornness, insensitivity (etc.) ‘emerge’ in the course of understanding (9a), when
the encoded concept BULLDOZER is literally inapplicable to Robert, and
the properties the speaker is understood as attributing to Robert are not
listed in the encyclopaedic entry of BULLDOZER (and so on for the other
examples)?
These questions have been raised by a number of philosophers interested in metaphor. Pugmire (1998: 99), discussing a metaphorical
use of ‘iron’ similar to the ‘bulldozer’ case in (9a), comments that ‘a
predicate does not project unmodified from a non-metaphorical into a
metaphorical context. Iron cannot, except metaphorically, be stubborn,
persistent, or headstrong’. Martinich (1984/91: 511), considering the
possibility that (9b) (‘Sally is a block of ice’) is understood by supplying the ‘commonplace’ that blocks of ice are cold and concluding that
Sally is cold, notes that an interpretation along these lines ‘trades on an
equivocation on “cold”’. In our terms, both these objections make the
same point: in order to derive the expected contextual implications,
some of the encyclopaedic information associated with the encoded
concepts BULLDOZER and BLOCK OF ICE has itself to be metaphorically
interpreted, so that the comprehension process involves a metaphor inside a metaphor (or a loose use inside a loose use). While interpretations along these lines seem intuitively plausible in at least some cases,
equivocation between premises and conclusion should invalidate an inference, so how is it compatible with a properly inferential account?
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In the case of (9c) (‘That surgeon is a butcher’), the problem is
rather different. It is not so much that some highly accessible information in the encyclopaedic entry for BUTCHER has to be metaphorically
interpreted (as ‘cold’ is metaphorically interpreted in the interpretation
of (9b)), but that there is no immediately obvious route from the encyclopaedic entry for BUTCHER to the expected implications at all. As
Vega Moreno (2004: 298) puts it,
‘Our knowledge of butchers does not include the assumption that butchers are incompetent and dangerous. The
properties that the hearer takes the speaker to be attributing to the surgeon are not stored as part of his representation of “butcher”, so must be derived by some other means
than simply searching through his knowledge about butchers.’
But in that case, how does use of the word ‘butcher’ contribute to relevance? What encyclopaedic features of butchers, when added to the
context and used as premises in inference, would contextually imply
that the surgeon in question is incompetent at his job, dangerous to
those he is supposed to help, not to be trusted with the lives of patients
(etc.)?
The role of emergent features in the comprehension of examples
such as (9a-c) has been experimentally investigated (see e.g. Tourangeau
and Rips 1991; Becker 1997; Gineste, Indurkhya, and Scart 2000). In
a typical off-line experiment, participants are asked to list features they
regard as strongly associated with noun phrases in isolation (e.g. ‘surgeon’, ‘butcher’). These noun phrases are then combined into metaphors (e.g. ‘That surgeon is a butcher’, ‘That butcher is a surgeon’), and
a different set of participants asked to list the features they take the metaphor to convey. The issue is how far the features listed for a metaphorical utterance as a whole overlap with those independently listed for
the metaphor vehicle (i.e. the metaphorically-used predicate), or those
common to both metaphor vehicle and metaphor topic (i.e. the subject
of the metaphorical utterance), with non-overlapping features classified
as ‘emergent’ (a rather broader conception of emergent properties than
the standard philosophical one). The results show that participants tend
to cite more emergent features than overlapping features for the metaphor as a whole, and to judge that emergent features are more relevant
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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to its interpretation than either topic-based, vehicle-based or common
features. This is true both for poetic metaphors (Gineste et al. 2000)
and for more prosaic everyday cases such as (10):
(10)

Men are wolves.

In connection with the interpretation of ‘wolves’ in (10), Tourangeau
and Rips (1991: 453) raise a version of the metaphorical reinterpretation problem discussed above in relation to the interpretation of ‘bulldozer’ in (9a) and ‘block of ice’ in (9b). They argue that some of the
encyclopaedic properties of wolves must undergo a transformation in
order to apply appropriately to men; so, for instance, the property of
wolves as predators is transformed into the property of competitiveness
among men:9
‘[(10)] is not usually intended to mean that men are carnivorous, although that is a feature shared by men and wolves;
instead the metaphor suggests that men are competitive in
their dealings with other men, a feature that does not characterize wolves.’
Before we go on to consider how the relevance-theoretic approach might
account for emergent properties, it is worth emphasising that this is an
issue for all pragmatic accounts of metaphor. For predominantly associative (non-inferential) accounts, the question is why the interpretation of metaphors such as (9)-(10) results in the activation of features not activated by the topic or vehicle in isolation. For the standard
Gricean account, which treats metaphor as a blatant violation of the first
Quality maxim (‘Do not say what you believe to be false’), designed to
convey a related true implicature, a similar question arises. Assuming
that the speaker of (9a) (‘Robert is a bulldozer’) implicates that Robert
ignores the feelings and opinions of others, and that the speaker of (9c)
(‘That surgeon is a butcher’) implicates that the surgeon in question
is grossly incompetent, dangerous and not to be trusted with patients’
lives, how is the hearer to derive these implicatures on the basis of his
encyclopaedic knowledge of bulldozers or butchers, together with other
items of background knowledge?
However, the emergent property problem has been seen as presenting a particular challenge to truth-conditional pragmatic accounts of
metaphor based on the construction of ad hoc concepts (including the
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relevance-theoretic account and alternative proposals by Black 1962;
Glucksberg 2001; Recanati 1995, 2004). For fully inferential versions
of this account (including relevance theory), the challenge is to justify
the move from encoded concept to communicated concept, and from
communicated concept to implicatures, in examples such as (9)-(10)
(see e.g. Carston 2002a; Vega Moreno 2004, 2007). For the continuity
view (including the relevance-theoretic version of it outlined in section
2), the challenge is to show that the emergent features of examples
such as (9)-(10) can be derived without appeal to special interpretive
mechanisms not required for ordinary non-metaphorical utterances. In
the next section, we will consider how these challenges might be met.

4. A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE ‘EMERGENCE’
PROBLEM

The ‘emergent property’ problem has been recognised and tackled by
researchers using the framework broadly known as cognitive linguistics, whose approach to metaphor differs in important ways from the
kind of inferential continuity account proposed above. Central to the
cognitive linguistics approach is the claim that metaphor is grounded in
a system of ‘mappings’ (i.e. correspondences or associations) between
elements from distinct cognitive domains (e.g. the domain of physical properties and the domain of psychological traits, or the domain
of machines and the domain of humans) (Lakoff 1987, 1994; Gibbs
1994, 1996; Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002). Since no-one, to our
knowledge, has suggested that hyperbole or approximation also involve
domain mappings (which indeed seems highly unlikely), advocates of
a ‘mapping’ approach to metaphor must reject the continuity view and
treat metaphor as a distinct category, with its own special interpretive
mechanisms. We see examples such as (7)-(8) above as providing evidence against a ‘mapping’ account and for the continuity view. The
relations between ‘domain mapping’ accounts of metaphor and fully inferential accounts deserve more detailed exploration than we can give
them here, and we hope to address them in future work. For now, we
simply note that, if our arguments for the continuity view are correct,
and if emergent properties can be derived using only the independently
motivated inferential mechanisms outlined in section 2 above, then dowww.thebalticyearbook.org
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main mappings may be best seen as resulting from the repeated use of
metaphors bringing together information from the same two domains,
and contributing to metaphor interpretation on the effort side, by increasing the accessibility of certain types of contextual assumptions and
implications, rather than playing the central role assigned to them in
most cognitive linguistic accounts.10 In the rest of this section, we will
suggest inferential analyses of the problematic examples in (9)-(10).
Notice, first, that emergent features are not restricted to metaphor.
Several psycholinguistic studies have investigated the derivation of emergent features in intuitively literal conceptual combinations such as those
in (11a) and (11b) (see e.g. Rips 1995; Hampton 1997; Glucksberg and
Estes 2000):
(11a)

‘casual shirt’, ‘pet bird’, ‘digital watch’

(11b)

‘smoky apple’, ‘sliced tulip’, ‘upside-down daisy’11

Rips (1995) groups the emergent features of these adjective-noun combinations into two broad types. Some of those associated with the familiar combinations in (11a) are available only to people who happen to
have encountered the objects in question. For instance, a ‘casual shirt’
was described by several participants as one that is PULLED OVER THE
HEAD , and a ‘digital watch’ as one that is RECTANGULAR . It would be hard
for someone with no prior experience of casual shirts or digital watches
to infer these features on the basis of encyclopaedic knowledge associated with the constituent concepts SHIRT, WATCH , CASUAL and DIGITAL.
By contrast, the emergent features of novel combinations such as those
in (11b) are inferable on the basis of encyclopaedic knowledge (what
Rips calls ‘mini-theories’) associated with the constituent concepts in
isolation. Thus, some participants described a ‘smoky apple’ as one that
TASTES BAD , and an ‘upside-down daisy’ as one that is UPROOTED . Discussing the ‘smoky apple’ example, Rips suggests that this second type
of feature might be inferred along the following lines:
‘As a start, our mini-theory for smoky things might specify
that they’re the result of exposure to heat, usually for an
extended period. Our mini-theory of apples is consistent
with the possibility that they could be exposed to heat in
this way. Furthermore, these mini-theories give us some
predictions about the probable effects of this treatment, for
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instance, that an apple might become dried, hot, blackened,
or bad-tasting ... In this way, we can put together a rich
composite view, a new mini-theory, of what smoky apples
are like that incorporates predictable emergent properties.’
(Rips 1995: 100).
Rephrasing this idea in relevance-theoretic terms, we could say that
the utterances in (12a) or (12b), when processed in a context made accessible by encyclopaedic knowledge associated with the encoded concepts SMOKY and APPLE, contextually imply the conclusions in (12c):
(12a)

This is a smoky apple.

(12b)

This apple is smoky.

(12c)

T HIS x

APPLE IS DRIED , HOT, BLACKENED , TASTES BAD ,

etc.

Contextual implications are drawn on the individual’s own responsibility and not necessarily attributed as part of a speaker’s meaning. However, if some of the contextual implications in (12c) are required to
make the utterance relevant in the expected way, they would be not only
contextual implications but also implicatures of (12a) or (12b). Rips
was not attempting a pragmatic account of emergent features: he simply presented participants with isolated noun-phrases and asked them
to list any features that occurred to them. When a novel conceptual
combination—whether literal or metaphorical—is processed in a (real
or imagined) discourse context, its interpretation is much more powerfully constrained, and hence much more predictable, for pragmatic
reasons.
The presence of a discourse context affects the interpretation of an
utterance in two main ways. First, it alters the accessibility of information in the encyclopaedic entries of its constituent concepts, which
in turn affects the accessibility of different contextual assumptions and
implications. Second, it sets up certain goals or expectations in the
hearer. Goal-directed inference is a form of backwards inference from
an expected (type of) conclusion to a set of premises that might be used
to derive it. As Barsalou (1991) has shown, goal-directed inference
speeds up the interpretation process and increases the predictability of
the results. So someone processing the phrase ‘smoky apple’ in the context of the question ‘What does a smoky apple taste like?’ should find
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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the emergent feature TASTES BAD doubly easy to derive, by forward inference from activated encyclopaedic information about the effects of
food preparation methods on the taste of food, and by backwards inference from the expected type of conclusion A SMOKY APPLE TASTES LIKE
___.
This prediction is confirmed by Glucksberg and Estes (2000), who
used a verification task to compare the processing of emergent and nonemergent features (in the broad sense used in psychology) assigned by
experimental participants to the conceptual combination ‘peeled apple’
in different discourse contexts. In one context, the emergent feature
WHITE was highly relevant (in both the intuitive sense and our theoretical sense), while in the other, the non-emergent feature ROUND
(standardly associated with the constituent concept APPLE) was highly
relevant (in both senses), while WHITE was not. The results showed
clearly that WHITE was verified faster and more accurately in the contexts where its retrieval made a contribution to relevance, while ROUND
was verified faster and more accurately in the contexts where its retrieval made a contribution to relevance. Glucksberg (2004: 86) comments:
‘Apparently, when people understand conceptual combinations in which any number of features are potentially available, feature accessibility is selective, favouring those features that are relevant in the particular context.’
Relevance theory provides a framework in which these effects of
discourse context on utterance interpretation can be described and explained. Like most pragmatic theories, it treats utterance interpretation
in general as goal-directed. The overall goal is to construct the best hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning, and different theories make different proposals about how this is done. According to relevance theory,
every utterance addressed to someone creates a presumption of relevance, together with more specific expectations about how relevance
is to be achieved (and in particular, about the type of contextual implications to be derived). The hearer’s immediate goal is to find an
overall interpretation that satisfies these expectations, since this is his
best hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning. As described above, the
relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic is an automatic inferential
procedure for constructing such an interpretation by following a path
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of least effort in mutually adjusting context, explicit content and contextual implications (via both forward and backward inference) so as to
make the utterance relevant in the expected way. Implicatures are contextual assumptions and implications that have to be added to the interpretation in order to satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the
utterance. We will try to show that these strong pragmatic constraints
on inferential comprehension play a central role in the derivation of
emergent features in metaphorical utterances, including the problematic examples in (9)-(10) above.
Returning to our original example in (1) (‘Caroline is a princess’),
let’s consider how it might be understood in the discourse context in
(13a), a question about the addressee’s younger sister Caroline, who is
manifestly not a princess:

possible ones (e.g. interpretations suggesting that Caroline will help
clear up the flood damage) is the fact that this is the first accessible
interpretation to make the utterance relevant in the expected way, and
it is therefore the one selected by the relevance-based comprehension
heuristic. Thus (14c) would be accepted not only as a contextual implication but also as an implicature of the utterance in (13b).
Vega Moreno (2004, 2007) has argued that the emergent features
of (9c) (‘That surgeon is a butcher’) can be inferentially derived along
similar lines. Here is a slightly adapted version of her account of how
the derivation might go. Suppose someone utters ‘That surgeon is a
butcher’ immediately after uttering (15a):
(15a)

That surgeon ought to be dismissed.

(13a)

Will Caroline help us clear up the flood damage?

(15b)

He is a butcher.

(13b)

Caroline is a princess.

The processing of (15a) would activate the hearer’s knowledge of surgeons (and of the particular surgeon referred to in the utterance), which
might include the logical feature IS A DOCTOR and more or less strongly
evidenced encyclopaedic assumptions such as those in (16): SURGEON:

The hearer’s goal in interpreting (13b) is to derive an answer to his
question (i.e. a conclusion of the form CAROLINE x WILL/WON’T CLEAR
UP THE FLOOD DAMAGE ). This could be done by enriching the encoded
sentence meaning as in (14a) and supplying the contextual assumption
in (14b):
(14a)

Explicit content:

CAROLINE x IS A PRINCESS *

(14b)

Contextual assumption:
DAMAGE .

A PRINCESS * DOESN ’ T CLEAR UP FLOOD

(14c)

Contextual implication:
THE FLOOD DAMAGE .

CAROLINE x WON ’ T HELP US CLEAR UP

Of course, the contextual assumption in (14b) is unlikely to be stored
ready-made in the encyclopaedic entry for PRINCESS, and to that extent the interpretation of (13b) involves the derivation of an emergent
feature (DOESN’T CLEAR UP FLOOD DAMAGE) in the broad sense used by
psychologists. However, this feature would be straightforwardly derivable in the course of the mutual adjustment process, by a combination
of forward inference from existing encyclopaedic features (e.g. UNUSED
TO PERFORMING MENIAL TASKS , UNACCUSTOMED TO MANUAL LABOUR ), and
backward inference based on the expected type of conclusion in (14c).
What justifies the choice of this interpretation over alternative, logically
www.thebalticyearbook.org

Encyclopaedic assumptions
(16a)

WORKS IN A HOSPITAL , IN STERILE CONDITIONS ,

etc.

(16b)

OPERATES ON HUMANS WITH CONCERN FOR THEIR WELFARE ,

(16c)

CUTS FLESH LIKE THIS :

(16d)

REQUIRES GREAT DEXTERITY, MEDICAL TRAINING , EDUCATION ,

etc.

[XXX], etc.
etc.

Here, ‘[XXX]’ is meant to stand for a representation (conceptual, sensory or kinaesthetic) of a surgeon’s manner of cutting flesh, broadly
construed to include information about the techniques and instruments
used, skills deployed, underlying intentions, physical conditions and
consequences, and so on.12 The processing of (15a) is also likely to
raise a question in the hearer’s mind about why the speaker thinks the
surgeon ought to be dismissed (is it for negligence or incompetence, for
moral turpitude, for quarrelling with his colleagues, as a cost-cutting
measure, and so on?), and an expectation that the next part of the
utterance will answer it by conveying a conclusion of the form THAT
SURGEON x OUGHT TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE ___.
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The processing of (15b) would activate the hearer’s knowledge of
butchers, which might include the logical features IS A TRADESMAN, SELLS
MEAT and more or less strongly evidenced encyclopaedic assumptions
such as those in (17):
BUTCHER:

Encyclopaedic assumptions

(17a)

WORKS IN A SHOP; SELLS BEEF, LAMB , PORK , POULTRY ,

(17b)

CUTS UP DEAD BODIES FOR USE IN COOKING ,

(17c)

CUTS FLESH LIKE THIS :

(17d)

REQUIRES VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND SKILLS ,

etc.

etc.

[YYY ], etc.
etc.

Here, assumptions (17b) and (17c) would be primed by the prior mention of ‘surgeon’ (given that a surgeon also cuts flesh). But a surgeon
who cuts flesh in the way a butcher does (using the same techniques,
with the same intentions, concern for welfare, degree of skill, etc.)
would be grossly incompetent and dangerous to patients, and would deserve to be dismissed. In the course of the mutual adjustment process, it
would therefore be relatively easy to construct an overall interpretation
on which the speaker of (15) is understood as asserting that the surgeon in question is a BUTCHER* (where a BUTCHER* is a person who cuts
flesh in a way appropriate to butchers), and implicating that he ought
to be dismissed because, being a BUTCHER*, he performs operations in a
grossly incompetent, dangerous way. This account of the derivation of
the emergent features of (9c) is genuinely inferential, with no appeal to
special interpretive mechanisms such as domain mappings.13
This account is oversimplified in one obvious respect. Although (15)
may evoke images of a surgeon hacking at flesh in the way a butcher
does, and these may put the hearer on the track of an overall interpretation that would satisfy his expectations of relevance by explaining
why the surgeon was dismissed, the assumption that the speaker meant
that the surgeon was a BUTCHER* in this sense (i.e. that he cuts flesh
in just the way a butcher does) is both factually and pragmatically implausible, and is unlikely to be accepted as it stands. To put the same
point another way, ‘butcher’ in (15) is not only a metaphor but a hyperbolic metaphor: BUTCHER* suggests a satisfactory line of interpretation,
but has to be broadened still further, retaining only those features of
the way a butcher cuts flesh that can also be plausibly attributed to a
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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few surgeons and would help to explain why the surgeon in question
was dismissed. Thus, the speaker of (15) might be understood as asserting that the surgeon in question was a BUTCHER** (i.e. that he cuts
flesh with a degree of skill, delicacy, preparation, reflection and concern for the physical consequences of his actions that are plausibly attributed to butchers and a few surgeons), and implicating that, being a
BUTCHER ** he operates in a grossly incompetent way and deserves to be
dismissed.14 Here, ‘operating with a certain degree of skill, etc.’, ‘operating in a grossly incompetent way, etc.’ and ‘deserving to be dismissed,
etc.’ are all emergent features in the following sense: they are not encyclopaedic features of BUTCHER, BUTCHER* or even BUTCHER** (since they
do not apply to actual butchers), but are inferentially derivable as contextual implications of the assertion that the surgeon is a BUTCHER**,
given a context containing standard encyclopaedic information about
surgeons.
Similar accounts can be given for at least some of the category crossing cases in section 3. Suppose that (10) (‘Men are wolves’) is uttered
during a conversation about how two business partners, Smithers and
McGee, have been trying to defraud each other and take over the business profits. Like (15), (10) is both a metaphor and a hyperbole. The
simplest account of the interpretation process might go as follows. The
utterance of (10) would activate the encoded concept WOLF, with (let’s
say) the logical feature ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN KIND and more or less
strongly evidenced encyclopaedic assumptions such as those in (18)
(many no doubt based on cultural stereotypes rather than biological
knowledge):
WOLF:

Encyclopaedic assumptions

(18a)

BY NATURE AGGRESSIVE , VICIOUS , MERCILESS , PREDATORY, SAVAGE

(18b)

SOLITARY OR HUNTS IN PACKS ; HOSTILE TO HUMANS , FRIGHTENING

Several of these features also apply to (some) men, and would be
simultaneously activated by the discourse context and expectations of
relevance. As a result of the mutual adjustment process, the speaker
of (10) might therefore be understood as asserting that men in general
are WOLVES* (where a WOLF* is by nature aggressive, vicious, merciless,
savage, solitary, hostile to humans, etc.), and implicating that aggressive, vicious, merciless, savage (etc.) behaviour is only to be expected
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from Smithers and McGee, because it is in their nature.
In fact, as Tourangeau and Rips (1991) point out, the features that
actually figure in our encyclopaedic entry for WOLF may be more specific than those suggested above, because wolves are vicious, aggressive,
savage and merciless (etc.) in a particular, wolf-like way. If so, these
more specific features might be represented as narrowed concepts (e.g.
VICIOUS *, SAVAGE *, along the lines discussed above for examples (4a-c)),
where VICIOUS* is paraphraseable as VICIOUS IN THE WOLF-LIKE WAY, and
so on for the other features. Each of these narrowed concepts would inherit many of its encyclopaedic features from the more general concept
(VICIOUS, SAVAGE, etc.) from which it is derived, but it would also have a
range of further features that apply specifically to wolves. In interpreting (10), the hearer’s goal is to find a set of encyclopaedic features of
VICIOUS *, SAVAGE *, etc. which apply not only to wolves but also to some
humans, and would explain why Smithers and McGee have been trying
to defraud each other even though they are business partners. Such
features might include, for instance, being vicious, savage, etc. even to
one’s own kind, and in a particularly intense, instinctive, unreflective,
physically aggressive, reckless and inhumane way. In that case, the
speaker of (10) might be understood as asserting (as before) that men
are WOLVES* and implicating that Smithers and McGee, being WOLVES*,
are by nature vicious, savage etc., even to each other, and in a particularly intense, instinctive, unreflective, physically aggressive, reckless,
inhumane way.15 Either account is compatible with a fully inferential
treatment of metaphor interpretation.
Let’s now look briefly at (9b) (‘Sally is a block of ice’), recalling
Martinich’s comment (see section 3 above) that inferential accounts of
this example run the risk of being invalidated by an equivocation in the
understanding of ‘cold’. To meet this challenge, we have to show how,
from the premise that the speaker has uttered the sentence ‘Sally is a
block of ice’, together with other easily accessible contextual assumptions, the hearer can validly infer that Sally is emotionally reserved,
unaffectionate, unresponsive to the overtures of others, etc.. At least
part of the account is straightforward, and the interpretation proceeds
along similar lines to the ones sketched above for (9c) (‘That surgeon is
a butcher’) and (10) (‘Men are wolves’). Suppose that Jenny utters ‘She
is a block of ice’ immediately after uttering (19a):
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(19a)

I had dinner with Sally last night.

(19b)

She’s a block of ice.

This utterance would automatically activate the encoded concept BLOCK
OF ICE , which has (let’s say) the associated logical feature FROZEN WATER
OF A CERTAIN FORM and more or less strongly evidenced encyclopaedic
assumptions such as those in (20):
BLOCK OF ICE :

Encyclopaedic assumptions

(20a)

SQUARE , SOLID , HARD , COLD , RIGID , INFLEXIBLE ,

(20b)

DIFFICULT / UNPLEASANT TO TOUCH , COME CLOSE TO, INTERACT
WITH ,

etc.

etc.

(20c)

MAKES THE SURROUNDING ATMOSPHERE UNCOMFORTABLE ,

(20d)

MAKES PEOPLE WANT TO MOVE AWAY ,

etc.

etc.

Several of these encyclopaedic features apply straightforwardly to
(some) humans as well as blocks of ice, and might also be activated by
the discourse context and expectations of relevance. At the same time,
the logical feature FROZEN WATER provides access to a ‘mini-theory’ of
how water is transformed by the freezing process from a natural substance which is soft, flexible and adapts to its surroundings, to a hard,
rigid, inanimate-seeming object which is incapable of adapting to its
surroundings. As a result of the mutual adjustment process, Jenny
might thus be understood as asserting that Sally is a BLOCK OF ICE*
(where a BLOCK OF ICE* is hard, rigid, inanimate-seeming, difficult to
interact with, unpleasant to touch or come close to and incapable of
adapting to its surroundings), and implicating that her evening with
Sally was not a success because, being a BLOCK OF ICE*, Sally has a limited capacity for human interaction or responses such as conversation
and the expression of emotion.
So far, we have only considered features of the encoded concept
BLOCK OF ICE which apply straightforwardly to humans. However, we assume, as pointed out by Martinich and others, that physical descriptions
such as ‘hard’, ‘rigid’, ‘inflexible’, ‘square’, ‘solid’, ‘cold’, ‘icy’, ‘frozen’,
etc., apply to humans only in an extended non-physical sense, which is
now presumably lexicalised but which arose via metaphorical extension
of the basic physical sense. The question is how the hearer can get from
the basic physical concepts which (presumably) feature in (20) above
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to broader senses that can be appropriately applied to Sally. According
to Martinich, there is no genuinely inferential route.
We want to argue that, given the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor outlined above, there are in fact two possible inferential routes,
each of which is likely to be exploited in at least some cases. The first
route involves taking seriously Martinich’s suggestion that the psychological senses of ‘hard’, ‘rigid’, ‘cold’, etc. are metaphorical extensions of
the basic physical senses. If so, it follows from the relevance-theoretic
analysis of metaphor that these extended senses arose through repeated
broadening of the basic physical senses (HARD, RIGID, COLD, etc.) to
create superordinate concepts (HARD*, RIGID*, COLD*, etc.) which are
not purely psychological but have both physical and psychological instances. On this approach, the denotation of the basic, physical sense
would be partially included in the denotation of the broader superordinate sense, and the encyclopaedic features of the superordinate sense
and the basic physical sense would overlap. If so, then a block of ice
can be truly described not only as HARD, RIGID, COLD, etc, but also as
HARD *, RIGID *, COLD *, etc, and both the basic physical features and the
more general physical/psychological features would figure in the encyclopaedic entry for BLOCK OF ICE. For a hearer following this inferential
route, the speaker of (9b) (‘Sally is a block of ice’) or (19b) (‘She’s a
block of ice’) might be understood as asserting that Sally is a BLOCK OF
ICE * (where BLOCK OF ICE * applies both to blocks of ice and to some
humans), and deriving the contextual implications that Sally is HARD*,
COLD *, RIGID * (etc.) (where HARD *, COLD *, RIGID * etc. are applicable
both to humans and to blocks of ice, and would be highly activated by
the discourse context and expectations of relevance). Of course, HARD*,
RIGID *, COLD * have their own encyclopaedic entries, some of the contents of which (e.g. RESERVED, UNRESPONSIVE TO THE FEELINGS OF OTHERS,
UNGENEROUS , etc.) apply only to the subset of humans in their domain
and might interact with contextual information about female humans
(and Sally in particular) to yield further contextual implications. As
a result of the mutual adjustment process, the speaker of (19b) might
therefore be understood as asserting that Sally is a BLOCK OF ICE*, and
implicating that she did not enjoy dinner with Sally because, being a
BLOCK OF ICE *, Sally is HARD *, COLD *, RIGID * (etc.), and therefore emotionally reserved, unresponsive to other people, unable to express her
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own feelings, unpleasant to interact with, be close to, and so on.
In a study of a wide range of these ‘double-function’ adjectives, Asch
(1955; 1958) explores the idea that there is a unitary conceptual basis
to the use of ‘cold’, ‘hard’, etc. to describe both physical and psychological properties. In his view, these inclusive concepts are grounded in
our observations of and interactions with our fellow humans, aspects of
whose behaviour and appearance we experience as relevantly similar to
our experience of interacting with physically cold/hard/etc. objects:
‘The hardness of a table and of a person concerns events
radically different in content and complexity, but the
schema of interaction is experienced as dynamically similar, having to do with the application of force and of resulting action in line with or contrary to it. What holds
in the preceding instance applies to the other terms in the
same category. Warm, aside from thermal qualities, stands
for bringing closer, or for drawing into a union, while cold
excludes or isolates.’ Asch (1958: 93)
Recast in our terms, what Asch is suggesting is that there is a lexicalised
superordinate concept (COLD*, HARD*, RIGID*) which applies both to objects that we find cold to the touch and to people whose personality we
would describe as cold, and which would be deployed in the interpretation of ‘Sally is a block of ice’.16 This fits with our analysis of how ‘Sally
is a block of ice’ would be understood by a hearer following the first of
our two possible inferential routes.
A second possible inferential route would start from the assumption
that polysemous words such as ‘hard’, ‘rigid’, ‘cold’, etc. have distinct
lexicalised physical and psychological senses (HARD and HARD**, RIGID
and RIGID**, COLD and COLD** etc.), whose denotations do not overlap
in the way described above for COLD and COLD*, HARD and HARD*, (etc.).
On this analysis, these psychological senses would not be metaphorical extensions of the basic physical senses (although they might have
arisen, in the history of the language or the individual, via narrowing
of such broader superordinate senses). Still, in our framework, where
non-lexicalised ad hoc concepts may be constructed on the fly in order
to satisfy expectations of relevance, it is easy to see how ad hoc (nonlexicalised) superordinate concepts such as COLD*, HARD*, (etc.), whose
denotations include both items that are COLD/HARD and items that are
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COLD **/ HARD **, might be constructed during the online interpretation
of (9b) (‘Sally is a block of ice’) or (19b) (‘She’s a block of ice’). In
this case, the superordinate concepts COLD*, HARD*, RIGID*, etc. would
be broadenings of the basic physical concepts COLD, HARD, RIGID, (etc.),
with overlapping encyclopaedic features and denotations. As a result,
BLOCK OF ICE would contextually imply COLD *, RIGID *, HARD * (etc.), and
the interpretation would proceed as for the first inferential route described above.
Independent evidence that at least one of these inferential routes
must be not only available but exploited in utterance interpretation
comes from similes such as (21), where ‘cold’ must be understood as
expressing a concept that is general enough to apply simultaneously to
both psychological and physical objects:

with physical appearances (Robert is physically big, heavy, clumsy in
his movements, pushes people aside in order to get past, etc.), others
more focused on psychological characteristics (Robert is a forceful personality, unstoppable when he has decided on a course of action or is
pursuing an idea, etc.).18 Suppose that two members of a university department, Mary and Robert, have very different views on how to cope
with the recent announcement that their department’s funding is to be
severely cut. Mary is reluctant to discuss her ideas with Robert, commenting, ‘Robert is a bulldozer’. In this discourse context, (9a) would
activate the encoded concept BULLDOZER, with (let’s say) the logical feature MACHINE OF A CERTAIN KIND and more or less strongly evidenced
encyclopaedic assumptions such as those in (23):

(21a)

I had dinner with Sally last night.

(23a)

LARGE ; POWERFUL ; CRUSHING ; DANGEROUS TO BYSTANDERS ,

(21b)

She’s as cold as a block of ice.

(23b)

LOOKS LIKE THIS :

(23c)

GOES STRAIGHT AHEAD REGARDLESS OF OBSTACLES ,

Attested examples of such similes from the British National Corpus include those in (22):
(22a)

His mind was as cold as the ice forming on the windscreen.

(22b)

His voice was as cold as the Arctic snows.

(22c)

His own voice was low and as cold as steel.

(22d)

His eyes were as cold as polar ice.

(22e)

His silvery-green eyes looked as cold as glacial ice.

(22f)

He’s good and great, but as cold as ice.

These do not seem to involve a pun or equivocation on ‘cold’. If so, they
provide further evidence that hearers are capable of accessing and using
a superordinate concept COLD* (whether lexicalised or non-lexicalised)
whose denotation includes both physical and psychological instances
and hence support our inferential account of how the emergent properties of (9b) (‘Sally is a block of ice’) are derived. (We are indebted to
Dan Sperber for discussion of this kind of example.)17
These inferential routes to the derivation of emergent properties
apply equally to (9a) (‘Robert is a bulldozer’). The metaphorical use
of ‘bulldozer’ has many possible interpretations, some more concerned
www.thebalticyearbook.org

BULLDOZER :

(23d)

Encyclopaedic assumptions

[XXX];

MOVES LIKE THIS :

etc.

[YYY ], etc.
etc.

PUSHES ASIDE OBSTRUCTIONS ; DESTROYS EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH ,

etc.
(23e)

HARD TO STOP / RESIST FROM OUTSIDE ; DROWNS OUT HUMAN VOICES ,

etc.
Some of these encyclopaedic features also apply straightforwardly
to humans. Others (e.g. POWERFUL, GOES STRAIGHT AHEAD REGARDLESS
OF OBSTACLES , PUSHES ASIDE OBSTRUCTIONS ) have both a basic, physical
sense and a further, psychologically-applicable sense, which may be frequently encountered and therefore often lexicalised. On the model of
our discussion of ‘cold’, ‘hard’, ‘rigid’, etc. above, we would suggest that
these words provide two potential inferential routes to the derivation
of emergent properties. One possibility is that ‘powerful’, ‘obstacle’, etc.
have both a basic physical sense and a broader, lexicalised, superordinate sense (POWERFUL*, OBSTACLE*, etc.) whose denotation includes
both physical and psychological instances. The other is that ‘powerful’,
‘obstacle’, etc. have non-overlapping lexicalised physical and psychological senses (POWERFUL and POWERFUL**, OBSTACLE and OBSTACLE**, etc.),
and that the interpretation of (9a) involves construction of a superordinate ad hoc concept (POWERFUL*, OBSTACLE*, etc.), which has both
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physical and psychological instances. In both cases, comprehension of
(9a) would involve the use of BULLDOZER to derive contextual implications containing superordinate concepts such as POWERFUL*, OBSTACLE*,
(etc.), which apply not only to bulldozers but to humans. As a result
of the mutual adjustment process, Mary might therefore be understood
as asserting that Robert is a BULLDOZER* (where a BULLDOZER*is POWERFUL *, CRUSHING *, GOES AHEAD REGARDLESS OF OBSTACLES *, etc.) and implicating that she is reluctant to discuss her ideas with him because, being a BULLDOZER*, he is POWERFUL*, CRUSHING*, GOES AHEAD REGARDLESS
OF OBSTACLES *, and therefore incapable of entering into a constructive,
or mutually satisfactory, discussion. As with our previous analyses, both
of these accounts are genuinely inferential: given the presumption of
relevance conveyed by all utterances, interpretations along these lines
are justified by the fact that Mary has produced this particular utterance
in this discourse context.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the last section, we have given relevance-theoretic analyses of several
metaphorical examples which have been widely seen in the literature
as raising, in a particularly striking way, the issue of how hearers are
able to recover emergent features of meaning. All other accounts we
know of (specifically those in the cognitive linguistics literature) appeal
to (non-inferential) associative mechanisms based on domain mappings
of one sort or another (conceptual metaphors, blending of features from
distinct domains). As noted above, on our inferential account, such associative links may arise as a result of repeated use of metaphors that
bring together information from two distinct domains, and may in turn
affect the outcome of the mutual adjustment process by altering the
accessibility of contextual assumptions and implications; however, the
resulting overall interpretation will only be accepted as the speaker’s intended meaning if it satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance and
is properly warranted by the inferential comprehension heuristic discussed in section 2. As expected on a continuity account, other kinds of
loose and even literal use can also give rise to emergent properties, although these are often less striking than in metaphorical examples such
as (9)-(10). We claim that all these types of example are interpreted
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by use of the same inferential comprehension procedure, with ad hoc
concepts being added to the explicit content in the course of the mutual adjustment process so as to warrant the derivation of the expected
contextual implications (or other cognitive effects).
We would like to suggest that the approach outlined here may shed
interesting new light on the widespread phenomenon of polysemy in
natural language (i.e. the fact that many or most linguistic forms have
a range of distinct, though related, lexicalised senses). Double function
adjectives such as ‘cold’, ‘sharp’, ‘hard’, and ‘bright’, some of which we
discussed briefly in the last section, are a case in point, since both the
psychological and the physical senses seem to be quite well-entrenched
in the language and are likely to be lexicalised in the vocabulary of most
speakers. Polysemy has been widely explored in frameworks that rely
on systems of pre-established (non-inferential, associative) mappings
between the elements of distinct cognitive domains (e.g. the physical and the psychological). We have suggested two possible inferential
routes by which polysemy may arise.
In some cases, polysemy may arise through an inferential process
of concept broadening, with the derived sense (e.g. COLD*, HARD*) being superordinate to the basic sense (e.g. COLD, HARD). In others, this
superordinate sense may undergo a further inferential process of concept narrowing, yielding a distinct, non-overlapping basic sense (e.g.
COLD **, HARD **) which may itself become lexicalised over time. In this
way, inferential pragmatic processes of lexical narrowing and broadening may give rise to a range of related superordinate or non-overlapping
lexicalised senses, with the appropriate analysis being established by
empirical investigation on a case-by-case basis. This approach, based
on a distinction between lexically encoded meanings and inferentially
derived meanings which may in turn give rise to further encoded lexical
meanings, might provide a useful theoretical framework for analysing
not only polysemy but also lexical semantic change.
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this republication.
1
The earliest treatment of metaphor within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson
1985/6; Sperber and Wilson 1986/95) took a similar line, while differing substantially in
its account of how the implicatures arose.
2
Kolaiti (2005) reports several metaphorical uses of ‘boiling’ in the Bank of English
corpus, describing e.g. rough seas, swirling clouds and chaotic thoughts. For a summary,
see ‘Corpus Analysis: An Overview’ by the AHRC Lexical Pragmatics project team, accessible from the project home page at www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/lexprag07/corpus.html
3
Kolaiti (2005) shows that narrowing and broadening interact in quite complex ways
in examples of this type. For instance, ‘empty property’ is sometimes used to mean a
property empty of tenants (in which case it must be literally understood: even a single
tenant is too many), and at other times to mean a property empty of furniture (in which
case it may be understood as an approximation, since the odd piece of remaining furniture
is inconsequential). See footnote 2 for details.
4
To save space, we present these simply as features rather than as complete propositions. However, since the function of encyclopaedic information is to provide premises
for the derivation of contextual implications, each feature should be seen as a constituent
of a complete proposition.
5
Here, the ‘etc.’ is intended to cover encyclopaedic features of strictly BOILING water
that do not hold for broader interpretations; in (8c), it covers encyclopaedic features that
hold both for strictly BOILING water and for water that is almost BOILING (i.e. BOILING *),
but not for water that is BOILING ** or BOILING ***; and so on for (8b) and (8a). (See
Sperber and Wilson 1998; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson and Carston 2007.) We are
not claiming, of course, that encyclopaedic information is neatly organised in this way:
merely that the choice of a particular set of assumptions in the course of the mutual
adjustment process will determine whether the utterance is intuitively ‘literal’, ‘approximate’, ‘metaphorical’, and so on.
6
As pointed out to us by Catherine Wearing, the word ‘boiling’ as understood in science
does not necessarily entail the presence of heat (in conditions of sufficiently low pressure,
water boils when it is cold). This is interesting, but has no particular consequences for
our account of how (7) is ordinarily understood, although it does suggest that for some
people, in some circumstances (rather few, we suspect), the literal, approximate and
hyperbolic uses of ‘boiling’ would, like metaphorical uses, carry no implications of heat.
7
A further potentially important difference which we will not discuss here has to do
with the nature of the superordinate categories themselves. The procedure that Glucksberg et al. propose for identifying appropriate superordinate categories (i.e. choose the
first superordinate category that includes both the metaphor topic and the metaphor vehicle) suggests that they are treating metaphor as a type of category extension in which
the superordinate category is arrived at by broadening alone (so in their example ‘My job
is a jail’, the superordinate category JAIL * would include both the category of actual jails
and the speaker’s job). In the relevance-theoretic account, by contrast, superordinate categories may be produced either by broadening alone or by a combination of broadening
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and narrowing (so PRINCESS* in (1) includes some, but not all, actual princesses), and
Glucksberg et al’s procedure for finding an appropriate superordinate category no longer
works straightforwardly.
8
These are fairly standardised cases, which might be listed in dictionaries as extra
figurative senses. In dialects where ‘bulldozer’ has acquired an extra lexicalised sense
( BULLDOZER*), the interpretation of (9a) would simply involve disambiguation plus contextual fine-tuning (see Vega Moreno 2004, 2007). From a historical point of view,
however, this extra sense is likely to have become lexicalised as a result of repeated
metaphorical uses of ‘bulldozer’ to convey the ad hoc concept BULLDOZER*, and it is this
non-lexicalised type of case we are interested in analysing here. For expository purposes,
it is convenient to use fairly standard examples that can be understood with a minimum
of scene setting. In the case of novel metaphors, of course, the disambiguation account
does not apply, and the only possible account is a wholly pragmatic one (for analysis of
some novel uses, see Rubio Fernandez 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008).
9
The same metaphor may, of course, receive quite different interpretations in other
circumstances: it might be understood as suggesting, for instance, that men ‘prey’ on
women in a way quite different from the preying of wolves on other creatures, or that
humans will treat each other ruthlessly and mercilessly in extreme situations, and so on.
The relevance-theoretic account sheds some light on the fact that even a conventional
metaphor such as this one may be interpreted differently across hearers and times, since
the accessibility of contextual assumptions varies across individuals and times.
10
For an interesting proposal to account for emergent properties by augmenting the
relevance-theoretic account with the machinery of domain mappings, see Gibbs and Tendahl (2006).
11
As shown by their stress patterns, the examples in (11a) and (11b) are productive
adjective-noun combinations, whose semantic interpretations are derivable by compositional rules. By contrast, the semantic interpretations of compound nouns such as ‘bird
house’ or ‘house bird’ are not systematically derivable, and we do not discuss them here.
12
Sensory and kinaesthetic representations are themselves a source of conceptual information which may provide premises for inference.
13
For more detailed analysis of this example, see Vega Moreno (2004, 2007); Sperber
and Wilson (2008). For an analysis using a cognitive linguistics framework, see Coulson
and Oakley (2005).
14
In the framework of relevance theory, these are treated as weak implicatures, in the
sense that no single one of them is essential to the interpretation and different hearers
are likely to settle on slightly different ones. (On the derivation of weak implicatures, see
Sperber and Wilson 2008.)
15
According to Tourangeau and Rips, the interpretation of (10) might involve a further
narrowing, from the general concept VICIOUS (etc.), which applies to both wolves and
(some) humans, to a more specific concept VICIOUS** (etc.), which means VICIOUS IN THE
HUMAN WAY (etc.). If so, we would treat it as resulting from inferential interaction between
the metaphor topic (‘men’) and the constructed ad hoc concept WOLF*, whose denotation
would not itself be affected by the interaction.
16
For interesting discussion, which brings out the significance of Asch’s work, see
Rakova (2003).
17
As this discussion shows, the interpretation of even a fairly standard metaphor such
as ‘Sally is a block of ice’ is to some extent vague and open-ended, a point which is
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often overlooked in philosophical and pragmatic accounts. For discussion of how this
open-endedness can be dealt with in an inferential account, see e.g. Sperber and Wilson
(1986/95: chapter 4, section 6); Pilkington (2000); Carston (2002a); Sperber and Wilson
(2008).
18
It’s worth noting that the Bank of English corpus (which contains 56 million words
of naturally occurring text and discourse) contains only three metaphorical uses of ‘bulldozer’: one a reference to a football player pushing people aside, and two references to
Jacques Chirac being nicknamed ‘the bulldozer’ (Kolaiti 2005).
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